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Summary
One of the key features of the Dodd-Frank Act is that it imposes specific and costly regulatory requirements
on banks that cross the threshold of having more than $10 billion in total assets. Anecdotal accounts have
suggested that this threshold has led to increased consolidation in the banking industry. This brief provides
new statistical evidence of that phenomenon. Banks that approach the $10 billion threshold are significantly
more likely to engage in an acquisition, pay more for that acquisition, and acquire bigger target banks than
similar banking institutions did prior to Dodd-Frank. To the extent that policymakers are concerned with
further consolidation in the banking industry, these findings should be of interest as they continue to evaluate
current regulations and develop new ones, which might include the use of bright line asset thresholds.
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Bright Lines: How Regulatory Asset 
Thresholds Change the Banking 
Industry
Allison Nicoletti, PhD; Michael Iselin, PhD; and Hailey Ballew
Debates about reforming or repealing various provisions of the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) have echoed 
throughout Congress since the bill became law.
Momentum picked up after the 2016 elections, but 
attempts at changing key features of the law always 
have been largely one-sided. In early December, 
however, the Senate Banking Committee advanced the 
“Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief and Consumer 
Protection Act,” S. 2155, to the full Senate. This bill 
met with bipartisan accord in the committee led by 
Chairman Mike Crapo (R-ID), with seven Repub-
licans and nine Democrats supporting its advance-
ment.1 S. 2155 contains policies that would amend, 
roll back, or eliminate key parts from Dodd-Frank. 
While this may simply be the next swing in a series of 
financial industry reform misses, the bipartisan nature 
of this particular bill’s support is notable given Con-
gress’s recent history in this arena.
In the summer of 2017, the briefly-but-highly 
scrutinized Financial CHOICE Act advanced out 
of the House Financial Services Committee and was 
passed by the House, in both instances along strictly 
partisan lines.2 Lacking enough support in the Sen-
ate, the bill has yet to reach the floor. That bill seeks, 
among other things, to repeal the Volcker Rule and 
to drastically scale back the regulatory authority of 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). 
SUMMARY
• One of the key features of the Dodd-Frank Act is that it imposes 
specific and costly regulatory requirements on banks that cross 
the threshold of having more than $10 billion in total assets.
• Anecdotal accounts have suggested that this threshold has led 
to increased consolidation in the banking industry. This brief 
provides new statistical evidence of that phenomenon. Banks 
that approach the $10 billion threshold are significantly more 
likely to engage in an acquisition, pay more for that acquisi-
tion, and acquire bigger target banks than similar banking 
institutions did prior to Dodd-Frank.
• As banks approach the $10 billion threshold and become sub-
ject to heightened regulation under Dodd-Frank, the evidence 
suggests that banks engage in an acquisition so as to improve 
their financial position. The fact that the costs of regulatory 
compliance do not vary significantly with total assets not only 
reinforces this incentive for acquisition, but makes it all the 
more desirable to acquire larger target banks.
• To the extent that policymakers are concerned with further 
consolidation in the banking industry, these findings should be 
of interest as they continue to evaluate current regulations and 
develop new ones, which might include the use of bright line 
asset thresholds that impose requirements with fixed compli-
ance costs.
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Comparatively, the scope of S. 2155 
is more modest. One of its primary 
provisions is the proposal to raise the 
asset threshold at which a bank hold-
ing company is considered a “systemi-
cally important financial institution” 
(SIFI) from $50 billion to $250 bil-
lion, and to exempt all banks with less 
than $100 billion in assets (up from 
$10 billion) from federal stress tests.3 
As policymakers debate the merits of 
such threshold changes, the lessons 
learned from the imposition of regula-
tory thresholds under Dodd-Frank 
could be instructive.
Currently, under Dodd-Frank, 
there are three particular requirements 
that are only imposed on banks with 
more than $10 billion in total assets: 
(1) regulatory oversight by the CFPB, 
which includes quarterly assessments, 
(2) the requirement to perform and 
report the results of annual company-
run stress tests (Dodd-Frank Act 
Stress Tests, or DFASTs), and (3) the 
Durbin Amendment, which restricts 
debit card interchange fees.4 In our 
research, we have discovered that 
these threshold-based regulatory 
requirements affect the acquisition 
activity of banks around those thresh-
olds. Specifically, we find that, in order 
to maintain relatively stable financial 
metrics (e.g., ROA) when suddenly 
subjected to the costs of stress tests 
and CFPB oversight, banks approach-
ing the current $10 billion asset 
threshold are much more likely to 
engage in an acquisition (+62%), pay 
more for that acquisition (+42%), and 
acquire bigger target banks (+52%), 
compared to the pre-Dodd-Frank 
period. In short, bright line thresh-
olds have increased consolidation 
in the banking industry. Although 
the financial press and analysts have 
highlighted anecdotal cases of this 
behavior,5 this Issue Brief discusses 
new statistical evidence showing that 
consolidation is a more widespread 
phenomenon.6
Our focus on acquisition activity 
in the banking industry is relevant 
given recent interest in consolidation 
at both the top of the industry, leading 
to banks that are “too big to fail,” and 
at the bottom of the industry, lead-
ing to the disappearance of smaller 
regional and community banks that 
serve important segments in the 
United States.7 With big changes to 
Dodd-Frank potentially on the hori-
zon, it is important for policymak-
ers to be mindful of how bright line 
thresholds may affect bank behavior in 
ways that may not be desirable from a 
public policy perspective.
THE ACQUISITION 
MOTIVATION
When banks cross the $10 billion 
threshold and incur the additional 
compliance costs associated with the 
new regulations (e.g., expenditures 
on new software, consultants, and 
employee salaries), their financial 
statement ratios, such as ROA or Tier 
1 capital, will be negatively affected. 
Because many of the new compliance 
costs do not vary significantly with 
total assets, engaging in an acquisition 
will not greatly increase them.8 Banks 
engage in acquisitions for a number 
of different reasons, but a common 
thread among them is the desire to 
improve their financial performance, 
which is often assessed through 
financial statement ratios. Thus, the 
decision to engage in an acquisition 
often involves a comparison between 
a bank’s current financial position and 
the projected financial position fol-
lowing an acquisition. We argue that 
the fixed nature of the compliance 
costs coupled with the focus on finan-
cial statement ratios results in stronger 
incentives for banks right around the 
threshold to engage in an acquisition, 
and the data reflect this (see Figure 1). 
These incentives can manifest in 
at least two different forms. First, the 
 1  The Hill, “Senate panel moves forward with bill to roll 
back Dodd-Frank,” available at http://thehill.com/policy/
finance/363404-senate-panel-moves-forward-with-bill-
to-roll-back-dodd-frank.
 2  HousingWire, “Senate Banking Committee introduces 
repeal of Dodd-Frank Act,” available at https://www.hous-
ingwire.com/articles/42010-senate-banking-committee-
introduces-repeal-of-dodd-frank-act.
 3  Supra note 1.
 4  The finalized regulation includes two different stress testing 
requirements: “company-run” stress tests (DFASTs) and 
“supervisory” stress tests. Mid-sized institutions, defined 
as those with total assets between $10 and $50 billion, are 
only required to conduct annual company-run stress tests, 
which involve assessing the sensitivity of bank health to 
several different scenarios issued by the Federal Reserve.
 5  Bloomberg, “Small Banks Feel the Urge to Merge,” 
available at  https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-
cles/2013-10-03/dodd-frank-fills-small-banks-with-the-
urge-to-merge.
 6  The primary source for this Issue Brief is our paper 
“Regulatory Asset Thresholds and Acquisition Activity in the 
Banking Industry.”
 7  Lux and Greene (2015).
 8  The Durbin Amendment, which restricts debit card inter-
change fees, is another significant cost imposed on banks 
with more than $10 billion in total assets. However, the 
costs associated with this requirement are less likely to 
be purely fixed. Given our focus on fixed costs, we do not 
discuss the Durbin Amendment in detail here.
 9  The increased costs resulting from CFPB oversight primari-
ly involve consultant work related to information technology 
systems, as well as operating costs related to disclosures, 
NOTES
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negative impact of the compliance 
costs on financial statement ratios will 
lower the benchmark against which 
potential targets will be compared and 
will make some previously unattractive 
targets look better to banks imme-
diately surrounding the threshold. 
Second, banks that were already attrac-
tive targets absent the new compliance 
costs now become more attractive 
to banks right around the threshold, 
potentially increasing their willingness 
to pay for those targets. Collectively, we 
argue that this increases the demand 
for acquisitions by banks approaching 
and just above the threshold, which 
results in an increase in both the num-
ber of acquisitions completed by the 
threshold banks and the deal premiums 
associated with those acquisitions. 
Although it is challenging to 
explicitly quantify the fixed compli-
ance costs, there is anecdotal evidence 
regarding the size banks need to grow 
to in order to “absorb” the additional 
costs.9 In a recent article, one report 
states that “a bank that crosses the $10 
billion threshold will probably need 
to grow its assets to at least $12 bil-
lion to get ‘an appropriate return.’”10 
This estimate is consistent with recent 
acquisitions involving banks sur-
rounding the threshold. For example, 
Berkshire Hills Bancorp recently 
announced the acquisition of Com-
merce Bancshares, which will take the 
bank from $9.3 billion in total assets 
to about $12 billion. The CEO states 
that “the Commerce acquisition would 
enable Berkshire to ‘fully absorb’ the 
impacts of crossing the $10 billion 
threshold.”11 Although anecdotal in 
nature, this discussion suggests that the 
additional costs result in the need for 
banks to grow to approximately $12 
billion in total assets. 
back office support, and error resolutions. The largest costs 
from stress testing result from the implementation of new 
software and data collection systems, as well as expenses 
for consultants and other employees. In addition, banks 
must publicly disclose the stress test results. 
 10  Smith (2016).
 11  Dobbs (2017).
 12  Gao et al. (2009).
 13  Forbes, “Ranking America’s 100 Largest Banks,” avail-
able at https://www.forbes.com/sites/kurtbadenhau-
sen/2017/01/10/full-list-ranking-americas-100-largest-
banks/#14fabe434c5a.
 14 Notably, there are 45 banks with total assets between $10 
and $25 billion and another 18 banks with total assets 
between $25 and $50 billion. See Forbes, ibid.
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FIGURE 1 PERCENT OF BANK-QUARTER OBSERVATIONS BY ASSET SIZE  
(IN BILLIONS)
E.g., roughly 21% of bank-quarter observations in the pre-Dodd-Frank period have end of quarter total assets between $5 and $6 billion
Summary: The increased willingness by banks right around the $10 billion threshold to pay for acquisitions not only results in an 
observed increase in deal premiums, but also an increase in the probability that a threshold bank wins the bid for potential target 
banks, thus increasing the observed number of acquisitions made by these post-Dodd-Frank threshold banks.
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THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF 
THRESHOLD-INCENTIVIZED 
MERGERS
We compared changes in acquisition 
activity for bank-quarters in the asset 
range of $9 to $12 billion in a pre-
Dodd-Frank-period (2003-2008) to 
similar activity for bank-quarters in 
the same asset range in a post-period 
(2011-2016). This allowed us to con-
trol for other costs and benefits associ-
ated with the acquisition decision for 
banks in this size range that would 
reasonably remain constant from the 
pre- to post-period (e.g., the direct 
costs of acquisitions). 
We documented an increase in the 
likelihood of engaging in an acquisi-
tion for a treatment group from the 
pre-period to the post-period rela-
tive to the same change for a control 
group. The marginal effect was an 
increase of 5.7 percentage points 
in the likelihood of engaging in an 
acquisition, which corresponds to 
an increase of 62% compared to the 
unconditional probability of engag-
ing in an acquisition for the treatment 
group. In our second test, we exam-
ined the amount of goodwill that was 
generated from an acquisition as a 
measure of the deal premium, because 
a majority of the target banks in our 
sample were private. We discovered an 
increase in the proportion of the deal 
value that was recorded as goodwill 
for acquisitions by the treatment 
group relative to those by the control 
group after the passage of the new 
regulations. The economic magnitude 
corresponds to a 42% increase in the 
“goodwill to deal value” ratio for the 
average acquisition in our treatment 
group. Simply put, the increase in both 
the quantity of acquisitions and the 
price at which those acquisitions were 
executed is consistent with an increase 
in the demand for acquisitions by 
banks that were affected by the signifi-
cant increase in compliance costs. 
To provide further support that 
the increased acquisition activity was 
associated with the new compliance 
costs, we performed an additional test 
that examined the relative size of the 
target bank to the acquiring bank. 
Holding all else equal, we hypoth-
esized that an acquisition of a rela-
tively larger target bank would more 
effectively mitigate the negative effects 
from crossing the threshold than 
would the acquisition of a smaller 
target bank. We tested this prediction 
by examining the relative size of the 
target bank to the acquiring bank for 
the subset of banks in our sample that 
completed an acquisition. Consistent 
with our predictions, we found that 
the treatment group increased the rel-
ative size of the target banks from the 
pre-period to the post-period relative 
to the same change for control group 
acquisitions. In terms of economic 
magnitude, the increase in the rela-
tive size corresponds to approximately 
52% of the average relative size for the 
treatment group. This provides supple-
mentary evidence that the increased 
demand for acquisitions documented 
in our main tests was indeed driven by 
the new regulatory compliance costs. 
THE ALTERNATE PATH: 
STAYING BELOW THE 
THRESHOLD
Although our main analyses focus on 
banks with incentives to engage in 
acquisition activity, we acknowledged 
that implementing regulations only 
on banks above an asset threshold 
may also have resulted in some banks 
taking actions in an effort to remain 
below the threshold to avoid the regu-
latory compliance costs altogether. 
Prior research documents evidence 
consistent with this behavior in other 
settings,12 but we performed an 
additional test to assess whether this 
behavior also existed in our setting. 
Specifically, we examined the demand 
for deposits by a treatment group 
with total assets between $8 and $10 
billion and compared their changes 
to a control group. We focused on 
the deposit mechanism, since each 
dollar of deposits that a bank accepts 
increases the amount of assets on their 
balance sheet and because customer 
deposits finance a majority of bank 
assets. Our results suggest that some 
banks below the threshold decreased 
both the growth rate on their deposit 
accounts and the interest rate paid on 
those accounts after the announce-
ment of the new regulations, relative 
to the same changes for a control 
group. Taken together, these findings 
are consistent with a decrease in the 
demand for deposits by banks just 
below the regulatory asset threshold 
after passage of the new regulations, 
corroborating the findings in earlier 
studies that examine different settings 
and mechanisms. 
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
FOR THE INCREASE IN 
ACQUISITIONS
One explanation for the increase in 
acquisitions is that there are certain 
bank types (i.e., “serial” acquirers) 
that differentially enter the treatment 
5
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and control groups in the pre- versus 
post-periods. Thus, it might be the 
selection of bank types that explains 
our results rather than the compliance 
costs. We performed two different 
tests to address this concern, but the 
results from these tests are consistent 
with the main results, indicating that 
certain bank types do not appear to 
drive our results. 
A second explanation is that some 
other concurrent event (e.g., the finan-
cial crisis) drove our results, rather 
than the compliance costs associated 
with the regulation. Importantly, our 
use of a control group mitigates this 
concern. Our design would not fully 
rule this out if there was an event 
occurring at the same point in time 
that differentially affected the treat-
ment and control groups. But after 
additional tests, we found that our 
results continue to hold across these 
different specifications. 
A final concern is that even 
though the regulations surrounding 
Dodd-Frank may be the driver of the 
behavior we document, there could 
be a different part of the regulation 
that is driving results. Alternatively, it 
could be the case that complying with 
the additional requirements results in 
benefits to the bank that make acqui-
sitions more attractive. This is unlikely 
to be a significant concern, however, 
given that we perform our tests using 
a group of control banks that are only 
larger than the treatment banks. Thus, 
the control group is subject to the 
same regulations and would presum-
ably experience the same benefits as 
the treatment group. This leaves the 
primary difference between these two 
groups as the extent to which fixed 
compliance costs affect bank financial 
statement ratios. 
REGULATORY TAKEAWAYS
Our findings should be of inter-
est to regulators and policymakers 
as they evaluate current regulations 
and implement new ones, which 
might include the use of bright line 
asset thresholds that impose require-
ments with fixed compliance costs. 
It is important to note that we do 
not argue that the evidence we have 
presented indicates that bright line 
thresholds in regulation should be 
discontinued or that the acquisitions 
made by banks after the implementa-
tion of the new regulations are ineffi-
cient choices. Instead, we contend that 
the potential for increased acquisition 
activity warrants consideration in 
evaluating the overall effect of these 
types of regulations. 
The proposal of a $100 billion 
asset threshold for stress tests under S. 
2155 appears to take the costs of com-
plying with regulations into account, 
offering relief to banks approaching 
the $10 billion threshold. There are 
only 18 banks with more than $100 
billion in total assets, and none have 
total assets in the $80 to $100 billion 
range (as of early 2017).13 Further-
more, banks approaching a new $100 
billion asset threshold in the future 
may not be similarly inclined to 
search for acquisition targets to vault 
over the threshold, because the costs 
of complying with regulatory over-
sight are largely fixed and likely would 
have a much smaller impact on bank 
financial ratios, relative to the impact 
on a $10 billion bank. In other words, 
bright line regulatory thresholds 
should not significantly affect acquisi-
tion decisions for the country’s biggest 
banks. But Congress could consider 
alternative thresholds for triggering 
mandatory stress tests (e.g., $25 or 
$50 billion) or layering regulatory 
requirements (i.e., setting different 
thresholds for stress tests and CFPB 
oversight).14 To the extent that poli-
cymakers are concerned with further 
consolidation in the banking industry, 
they can now consider the effects that 
bright line asset thresholds have had 
in recent years when deciding how to 
make changes for the future.
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